diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index c29a34c9bd4..c34663e412c 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/SSRF: expand IPv4 fetch guard blocking to include RFC special-use/non-global ranges (including benchmarking, TEST-NET, multicast, and reserved/broadcast blocks), and centralize range checks into a single CIDR policy table to reduce classifier drift.
 - Security/Archive: block zip symlink escapes during archive extraction.
 - Security/Media sandbox: keep tmp media allowance for absolute tmp paths only and enforce symlink-escape checks before sandbox-validated reads, preventing tmp symlink exfiltration and relative `../` sandbox escapes when sandboxes live under tmp. (#17892) Thanks @dashed.
+- Browser/Upload: accept canonical in-root upload paths when the configured uploads directory is a symlink alias (for example `/tmp` -> `/private/tmp` on macOS), so browser upload validation no longer rejects valid files during client->server revalidation. (#23300, #23222, #22848) Thanks @bgaither4, @parkerati, and @Nabsku.
 - Security/Discord: add `openclaw security audit` warnings for name/tag-based Discord allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel `users`, and pairing-store entries), highlighting slug-collision risk while keeping name-based matching supported, and canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs at runtime without rewriting config files. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Gateway: block node-role connections when device identity metadata is missing.
 - Security/Media: enforce inbound media byte limits during download/read across Discord, Telegram, Zalo, Microsoft Teams, and BlueBubbles to prevent oversized payload memory spikes before rejection. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
diff --git a/src/browser/paths.test.ts b/src/browser/paths.test.ts
index 1178753ff92..441ee05b869 100644
--- a/src/browser/paths.test.ts
+++ b/src/browser/paths.test.ts
@@ -138,6 +138,60 @@ describe("resolveExistingPathsWithinRoot", () => {
       });
     },
   );
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+    "accepts canonical absolute paths when upload root is a symlink alias",
+    async () => {
+      await withFixtureRoot(async ({ baseDir }) => {
+        const canonicalUploadsDir = path.join(baseDir, "canonical", "uploads");
+        const aliasedUploadsDir = path.join(baseDir, "uploads-link");
+        await fs.mkdir(canonicalUploadsDir, { recursive: true });
+        await fs.symlink(canonicalUploadsDir, aliasedUploadsDir);
+
+        const filePath = path.join(canonicalUploadsDir, "ok.txt");
+        await fs.writeFile(filePath, "ok", "utf8");
+        const canonicalPath = await fs.realpath(filePath);
+
+        const firstPass = await resolveWithinUploads({
+          uploadsDir: aliasedUploadsDir,
+          requestedPaths: [path.join(aliasedUploadsDir, "ok.txt")],
+        });
+        expect(firstPass.ok).toBe(true);
+
+        const secondPass = await resolveWithinUploads({
+          uploadsDir: aliasedUploadsDir,
+          requestedPaths: [canonicalPath],
+        });
+        expect(secondPass.ok).toBe(true);
+        if (secondPass.ok) {
+          expect(secondPass.paths).toEqual([canonicalPath]);
+        }
+      });
+    },
+  );
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+    "rejects canonical absolute paths outside symlinked upload root",
+    async () => {
+      await withFixtureRoot(async ({ baseDir }) => {
+        const canonicalUploadsDir = path.join(baseDir, "canonical", "uploads");
+        const aliasedUploadsDir = path.join(baseDir, "uploads-link");
+        await fs.mkdir(canonicalUploadsDir, { recursive: true });
+        await fs.symlink(canonicalUploadsDir, aliasedUploadsDir);
+
+        const outsideDir = path.join(baseDir, "outside");
+        await fs.mkdir(outsideDir, { recursive: true });
+        const outsideFile = path.join(outsideDir, "secret.txt");
+        await fs.writeFile(outsideFile, "secret", "utf8");
+
+        const result = await resolveWithinUploads({
+          uploadsDir: aliasedUploadsDir,
+          requestedPaths: [await fs.realpath(outsideFile)],
+        });
+        expectInvalidResult(result, "must stay within uploads directory");
+      });
+    },
+  );
 });
 
 describe("resolvePathWithinRoot", () => {
diff --git a/src/browser/paths.ts b/src/browser/paths.ts
index 3af2bd149e1..0b458e44dec 100644
--- a/src/browser/paths.ts
+++ b/src/browser/paths.ts
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import fs from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { SafeOpenError, openFileWithinRoot } from "../infra/fs-safe.js";
 import { resolvePreferredOpenClawTmpDir } from "../infra/tmp-openclaw-dir.js";
@@ -54,30 +55,73 @@ export async function resolveExistingPathsWithinRoot(params: {
   requestedPaths: string[];
   scopeLabel: string;
 }): Promise<{ ok: true; paths: string[] } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
-  const resolvedPaths: string[] = [];
-  for (const raw of params.requestedPaths) {
-    const pathResult = resolvePathWithinRoot({
-      rootDir: params.rootDir,
-      requestedPath: raw,
+  const rootDir = path.resolve(params.rootDir);
+  let rootRealPath: string | undefined;
+  try {
+    rootRealPath = await fs.realpath(rootDir);
+  } catch {
+    // Keep historical behavior for missing roots and rely on openFileWithinRoot for final checks.
+    rootRealPath = undefined;
+  }
+
+  const isInRoot = (relativePath: string) =>
+    Boolean(relativePath) && !relativePath.startsWith("..") && !path.isAbsolute(relativePath);
+
+  const resolveExistingRelativePath = async (
+    requestedPath: string,
+  ): Promise<
+    { ok: true; relativePath: string; fallbackPath: string } | { ok: false; error: string }
+  > => {
+    const raw = requestedPath.trim();
+    const lexicalPathResult = resolvePathWithinRoot({
+      rootDir,
+      requestedPath,
       scopeLabel: params.scopeLabel,
     });
+    if (lexicalPathResult.ok) {
+      return {
+        ok: true,
+        relativePath: path.relative(rootDir, lexicalPathResult.path),
+        fallbackPath: lexicalPathResult.path,
+      };
+    }
+    if (!rootRealPath || !raw || !path.isAbsolute(raw)) {
+      return lexicalPathResult;
+    }
+    try {
+      const resolvedExistingPath = await fs.realpath(raw);
+      const relativePath = path.relative(rootRealPath, resolvedExistingPath);
+      if (!isInRoot(relativePath)) {
+        return lexicalPathResult;
+      }
+      return {
+        ok: true,
+        relativePath,
+        fallbackPath: resolvedExistingPath,
+      };
+    } catch {
+      return lexicalPathResult;
+    }
+  };
+
+  const resolvedPaths: string[] = [];
+  for (const raw of params.requestedPaths) {
+    const pathResult = await resolveExistingRelativePath(raw);
     if (!pathResult.ok) {
       return { ok: false, error: pathResult.error };
     }
 
-    const rootDir = path.resolve(params.rootDir);
-    const relativePath = path.relative(rootDir, pathResult.path);
     let opened: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof openFileWithinRoot>> | undefined;
     try {
       opened = await openFileWithinRoot({
         rootDir,
-        relativePath,
+        relativePath: pathResult.relativePath,
       });
       resolvedPaths.push(opened.realPath);
     } catch (err) {
       if (err instanceof SafeOpenError && err.code === "not-found") {
         // Preserve historical behavior for paths that do not exist yet.
-        resolvedPaths.push(pathResult.path);
+        resolvedPaths.push(pathResult.fallbackPath);
         continue;
       }
       return {