Merge branch 'main' into vincentkoc-code/config-log-spam-dedupe

.github/actions/ensure-base-commit/action.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: Ensure base commit
+description: Ensure a shallow checkout has enough history to diff against a base SHA.
+inputs:
+  base-sha:
+    description: Base commit SHA to diff against.
+    required: true
+  fetch-ref:
+    description: Branch or ref to deepen/fetch from origin when base-sha is missing.
+    required: true
+runs:
+  using: composite
+  steps:
+    - name: Ensure base commit is available
+      shell: bash
+      env:
+        BASE_SHA: ${{ inputs.base-sha }}
+        FETCH_REF: ${{ inputs.fetch-ref }}
+      run: |
+        set -euo pipefail
+
+        if [ -z "$BASE_SHA" ] || [[ "$BASE_SHA" =~ ^0+$ ]]; then
+          echo "No concrete base SHA available; skipping targeted fetch."
+          exit 0
+        fi
+
+        if git rev-parse --verify "$BASE_SHA^{commit}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+          echo "Base commit already present: $BASE_SHA"
+          exit 0
+        fi
+
+        for deepen_by in 25 100 300; do
+          echo "Base commit missing; deepening $FETCH_REF by $deepen_by."
+          git fetch --no-tags --deepen="$deepen_by" origin "$FETCH_REF" || true
+          if git rev-parse --verify "$BASE_SHA^{commit}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            echo "Resolved base commit after deepening: $BASE_SHA"
+            exit 0
+          fi
+        done
+
+        echo "Base commit still missing; fetching full history for $FETCH_REF."
+        git fetch --no-tags origin "$FETCH_REF" || true
+        if git rev-parse --verify "$BASE_SHA^{commit}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+          echo "Resolved base commit after full ref fetch: $BASE_SHA"
+          exit 0
+        fi
+
+        echo "Base commit still unavailable after fetch attempts: $BASE_SHA"

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -21,10 +21,16 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
-          fetch-depth: 50
+          fetch-depth: 1
           fetch-tags: false
           submodules: false
 
+      - name: Ensure docs-scope base commit
+        uses: ./.github/actions/ensure-base-commit
+        with:
+          base-sha: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.event.before || github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          fetch-ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref_name || github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
+
       - name: Detect docs-only changes
         id: check
         uses: ./.github/actions/detect-docs-changes
@@ -46,10 +52,16 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
-          fetch-depth: 50
+          fetch-depth: 1
           fetch-tags: false
           submodules: false
 
+      - name: Ensure changed-scope base commit
+        uses: ./.github/actions/ensure-base-commit
+        with:
+          base-sha: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.event.before || github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          fetch-ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref_name || github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
+
       - name: Detect changed scopes
         id: scope
         shell: bash
@@ -75,6 +87,13 @@ jobs:
         with:
           submodules: false
 
+      - name: Ensure secrets base commit (PR fast path)
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+        uses: ./.github/actions/ensure-base-commit
+        with:
+          base-sha: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          fetch-ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
+
       - name: Setup Node environment
         uses: ./.github/actions/setup-node-env
         with:
@@ -303,13 +322,39 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install pre-commit
         run: |
           python -m pip install --upgrade pip
-          python -m pip install pre-commit detect-secrets==1.5.0
+          python -m pip install pre-commit
 
       - name: Detect secrets
         run: |
-          if ! detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline; then
+          set -euo pipefail
-            echo "::error::Secret scanning failed. See docs/gateway/security.md#secret-scanning-detect-secrets"
+
-            exit 1
+          if [ "${{ github.ref }}" = "refs/heads/main" ]; then
+            echo "Skipping detect-secrets on main until the allowlist cleanup lands."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "push" ]; then
+            echo "Running full detect-secrets scan on push."
+            pre-commit run --all-files detect-secrets
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
+          changed_files=()
+          if git rev-parse --verify "$BASE^{commit}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            while IFS= read -r path; do
+              [ -n "$path" ] || continue
+              [ -f "$path" ] || continue
+              changed_files+=("$path")
+            done < <(git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR "$BASE" HEAD)
+          fi
+
+          if [ "${#changed_files[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
+            echo "Running detect-secrets on ${#changed_files[@]} changed file(s)."
+            pre-commit run detect-secrets --files "${changed_files[@]}"
+          else
+            echo "Falling back to full detect-secrets scan."
+            pre-commit run --all-files detect-secrets
           fi
 
       - name: Detect committed private keys

.github/workflows/install-smoke.yml

@@ -19,9 +19,15 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
-          fetch-depth: 50
+          fetch-depth: 1
           fetch-tags: false
 
+      - name: Ensure docs-scope base commit
+        uses: ./.github/actions/ensure-base-commit
+        with:
+          base-sha: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.event.before || github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          fetch-ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref_name || github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
+
       - name: Detect docs-only changes
         id: check
         uses: ./.github/actions/detect-docs-changes

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Plugin runtime/events: expose `runtime.events.onAgentEvent` and `runtime.events.onSessionTranscriptUpdate` for extension-side subscriptions, and isolate transcript-listener failures so one faulty listener cannot break the entire update fanout. (#16044) Thanks @scifantastic.
 - CLI/Banner taglines: add `cli.banner.taglineMode` (`random` | `default` | `off`) to control funny tagline behavior in startup output, with docs + FAQ guidance and regression tests for config override behavior.
 - Agents/compaction safeguard quality-audit rollout: keep summary quality audits disabled by default unless `agents.defaults.compaction.qualityGuard` is explicitly enabled, and add config plumbing for bounded retry control. (#25556) thanks @rodrigouroz.
+- Gateway/input_image MIME validation: sniff uploaded image bytes before MIME allowlist enforcement again so declared image types cannot mask concrete non-image payloads, while keeping HEIC/HEIF normalization behavior scoped to actual HEIC inputs. Thanks @vincentkoc.
 
 ### Breaking
 

docs/gateway/security/index.md

@@ -1158,19 +1158,22 @@ If your AI does something bad:
 
 ## Secret Scanning (detect-secrets)
 
-CI runs `detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline` in the `secrets` job.
+CI runs the `detect-secrets` pre-commit hook in the `secrets` job.
-If it fails, there are new candidates not yet in the baseline.
+Pushes to `main` always run an all-files scan. Pull requests use a changed-file
+fast path when a base commit is available, and fall back to an all-files scan
+otherwise. If it fails, there are new candidates not yet in the baseline.
 
 ### If CI fails
 
 1. Reproduce locally:
 
    ```bash
-   detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline
+   pre-commit run --all-files detect-secrets
    ```
 
 2. Understand the tools:
-   - `detect-secrets scan` finds candidates and compares them to the baseline.
+   - `detect-secrets` in pre-commit runs `detect-secrets-hook` with the repo's
+     baseline and excludes.
    - `detect-secrets audit` opens an interactive review to mark each baseline
      item as real or false positive.
 3. For real secrets: rotate/remove them, then re-run the scan to update the baseline.

src/media/input-files.fetch-guard.test.ts

@@ -99,7 +99,9 @@ describe("HEIC input image normalization", () => {
     expect(release).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
   });
 
-  it("keeps declared MIME for non-HEIC images without sniffing", async () => {
+  it("keeps declared MIME for non-HEIC images after validation", async () => {
+    detectMimeMock.mockResolvedValueOnce("image/png");
+
     const image = await extractImageContentFromSource(
       {
         type: "base64",
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ describe("HEIC input image normalization", () => {
       },
     );
 
-    expect(detectMimeMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(detectMimeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
     expect(convertHeicToJpegMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
     expect(image).toEqual({
       type: "image",
@@ -123,6 +125,59 @@ describe("HEIC input image normalization", () => {
       mimeType: "image/png",
     });
   });
+
+  it("rejects spoofed base64 images when detected bytes are not an image", async () => {
+    detectMimeMock.mockResolvedValueOnce("application/pdf");
+
+    await expect(
+      extractImageContentFromSource(
+        {
+          type: "base64",
+          data: Buffer.from("%PDF-1.4\n").toString("base64"),
+          mediaType: "image/png",
+        },
+        {
+          allowUrl: false,
+          allowedMimes: new Set(["image/png", "image/jpeg"]),
+          maxBytes: 1024 * 1024,
+          maxRedirects: 0,
+          timeoutMs: 1,
+        },
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow("Unsupported image MIME type: application/pdf");
+    expect(convertHeicToJpegMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects spoofed URL images when detected bytes are not an image", async () => {
+    const release = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    fetchWithSsrFGuardMock.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+      response: new Response(Buffer.from("%PDF-1.4\n"), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+      }),
+      release,
+      finalUrl: "https://example.com/photo.png",
+    });
+    detectMimeMock.mockResolvedValueOnce("application/pdf");
+
+    await expect(
+      extractImageContentFromSource(
+        {
+          type: "url",
+          url: "https://example.com/photo.png",
+        },
+        {
+          allowUrl: true,
+          allowedMimes: new Set(["image/png", "image/jpeg"]),
+          maxBytes: 1024 * 1024,
+          maxRedirects: 0,
+          timeoutMs: 1000,
+        },
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow("Unsupported image MIME type: application/pdf");
+    expect(release).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(convertHeicToJpegMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
 });
 
 describe("fetchWithGuard", () => {

src/media/input-files.ts

@@ -235,11 +235,17 @@ async function normalizeInputImage(params: {
   limits: InputImageLimits;
 }): Promise<InputImageContent> {
   const declaredMime = normalizeMimeType(params.mimeType) ?? "application/octet-stream";
-  const sourceMime = HEIC_INPUT_IMAGE_MIMES.has(declaredMime)
+  const detectedMime = normalizeMimeType(
-    ? (normalizeMimeType(
+    await detectMime({ buffer: params.buffer, headerMime: params.mimeType }),
-        await detectMime({ buffer: params.buffer, headerMime: params.mimeType }),
+  );
-      ) ?? declaredMime)
+  if (declaredMime.startsWith("image/") && detectedMime && !detectedMime.startsWith("image/")) {
-    : declaredMime;
+    throw new Error(`Unsupported image MIME type: ${detectedMime}`);
+  }
+  const sourceMime =
+    (detectedMime && HEIC_INPUT_IMAGE_MIMES.has(detectedMime)) ||
+    (HEIC_INPUT_IMAGE_MIMES.has(declaredMime) && !detectedMime)
+      ? (detectedMime ?? declaredMime)
+      : declaredMime;
   if (!params.limits.allowedMimes.has(sourceMime)) {
     throw new Error(`Unsupported image MIME type: ${sourceMime}`);
   }