docs(changelog): credit GHSA-6f6j reporter

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Peter Steinberger 2026-03-02 01:04:15 +00:00
parent c823a85302
commit e1a9ba8400

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@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- ACP/Harness thread spawn routing: force ACP harness thread creation through `sessions_spawn` (`runtime: "acp"`, `thread: true`) and explicitly forbid `message action=thread-create` for ACP harness requests, avoiding misrouted `Unknown channel` errors. (#30957) Thanks @dutifulbob.
- Docs/ACP permissions: document the correct `permissionMode` default (`approve-reads`) and clarify non-interactive permission failure behavior/troubleshooting guidance. (#31044) Thanks @barronlroth.
- Security/Logging utility hardening: remove `eval`-based command execution from `scripts/clawlog.sh`, switch to argv-safe command construction, and escape predicate literals for user-supplied search/category filters to block local command/predicate injection paths.
- Security/ACPX Windows spawn hardening: resolve `.cmd/.bat` wrappers via PATH/PATHEXT and execute unwrapped Node/EXE entrypoints without shell parsing when possible, while preserving compatibility fallback for unknown custom wrappers by default and adding an opt-in strict mode (`strictWindowsCmdWrapper`) to fail closed for unresolvable wrappers.
- Security/ACPX Windows spawn hardening: resolve `.cmd/.bat` wrappers via PATH/PATHEXT and execute unwrapped Node/EXE entrypoints without shell parsing when possible, while preserving compatibility fallback for unknown custom wrappers by default and adding an opt-in strict mode (`strictWindowsCmdWrapper`) to fail closed for unresolvable wrappers. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Security/Inbound metadata stripping: tighten sentinel matching and JSON-fence validation for inbound metadata stripping so user-authored lookalike lines no longer trigger unintended metadata removal.
- Security/Zalo webhook memory hardening: bound webhook security tracking state and normalize security keying to matched webhook paths (excluding attacker query-string churn) to prevent unauthenticated memory growth pressure on reachable webhook endpoints. Thanks @Somet2mes.
- Channels/Command parsing parity: align command-body parsing fields with channel command-gating text for Slack, Signal, Microsoft Teams, Mattermost, and BlueBubbles to avoid mention-strip mismatches and inconsistent command detection.