40 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tomi
c308410d80 fix(sandbox): pull pre-built image from GHCR instead of plain debian:bookworm-slim
Fixes a regression where 'openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim' was created by
pulling debian:bookworm-slim (which has no python3), causing file write/edit
tools to fail with 'python3: not found' inside the sandbox container.

Before: always pulled debian:bookworm-slim (no python3)
After:  tries ghcr.io/openclaw/openclaw:main-slim-amd64 first (has python3),
        falls back to building locally from Dockerfile.sandbox if needed.

Fixes openclaw/openclaw#51099
2026-03-21 01:32:24 +08:00
Peter Steinberger
46f49eb6eb refactor: shrink plugin sdk public surface 2026-03-18 23:31:08 +00:00
Vincent Koc
b4f16bad32 Plugin SDK: export windows spawn and temp path 2026-03-18 09:46:24 -07:00
Peter Steinberger
d8b927ee6a
feat: add openshell sandbox backend 2026-03-15 20:03:22 -07:00
Vincent Koc
bd33a340fb
fix(sandbox): sanitize Docker env before marking OPENCLAW_CLI (#42256)
* Sandbox: sanitize Docker env before exec marker injection

* Sandbox: add regression test for Docker exec marker env

* Sandbox: disable Windows shell fallback for Docker

* Sandbox: cover Windows Docker wrapper rejection

* Sandbox: test strict env sanitization through Docker args
2026-03-11 00:59:36 -04:00
Vincent Koc
b48291e01e
Exec: mark child command env with OPENCLAW_CLI (#41411) 2026-03-09 19:14:08 -04:00
Peter Steinberger
7066d5e192 refactor: extract shared sandbox and gateway plumbing 2026-03-02 23:16:47 +00:00
Evan
903e4dff35 fix(sandbox): make /workspace bind mount read-only when workspaceAccess is not rw
This ensures that when workspaceAccess is set to 'ro' or 'none', the
sandbox workspace (/workspace inside the container) is mounted as
read-only, matching the documented behavior.

Previously, the condition was:
  workspaceAccess === 'ro' && workspaceDir === agentWorkspaceDir

This was always false in 'ro' mode because workspaceDir equals
sandboxWorkspaceDir, not agentWorkspaceDir.

Now the logic is simplified:
  - 'rw': /workspace is writable
  - 'ro': /workspace is read-only
  - 'none': /workspace is read-only
2026-03-02 22:58:09 +00:00
Alessandro Rodi
f257818ea5
fix(sandbox): prevent Windows PATH from poisoning docker exec (#13873)
* fix(sandbox): prevent Windows PATH from poisoning docker exec shell lookup

On Windows hosts, `buildDockerExecArgs` passes the host PATH env var
(containing Windows paths like `C:\Windows\System32`) to `docker exec -e
PATH=...`. Docker uses this PATH to resolve the executable argument
(`sh`), which fails because Windows paths don't exist in the Linux
container — producing `exec: "sh": executable file not found in $PATH`.

Two changes:
- Skip PATH in the `-e` env loop (it's already handled separately via
  OPENCLAW_PREPEND_PATH + shell export)
- Use absolute `/bin/sh` instead of bare `sh` to eliminate PATH
  dependency entirely

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: add braces around continue to satisfy linter

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): update assertion to match /bin/sh in buildDockerExecArgs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 16:17:33 -06:00
Tak Hoffman
cd653c55d7
windows: unify non-core spawn handling across acp qmd and docker (openclaw#31750) thanks @Takhoffman
Verified:
- pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- pnpm build
- pnpm check (fails on pre-existing unrelated src/slack/monitor/events/messages.ts typing errors)
- pnpm vitest run src/acp/client.test.ts src/memory/qmd-manager.test.ts src/agents/sandbox/docker.execDockerRaw.enoent.test.ts src/agents/sandbox/docker.windows.test.ts extensions/acpx/src/runtime-internals/process.test.ts

Co-authored-by: Takhoffman <781889+Takhoffman@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-02 08:05:39 -06:00
AaronWander
366374b4ff
Sandbox: add actionable error when docker missing (#28547)
Co-authored-by: AaronWander <siralonne@163.com>
2026-03-01 22:14:26 -08:00
Peter Steinberger
14b6eea6e3 feat(sandbox): block container namespace joins by default 2026-02-24 23:20:34 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
c070be1bc4 fix(sandbox): harden fs bridge path checks and bind mount policy 2026-02-24 02:21:43 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
6f895eb831 fix(sandbox): honor explicit bind mounts over workspace defaults
Co-authored-by: tasaankaeris <tasaankaeris@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-22 20:37:22 +01:00
Harry Cui Kepler
ffa63173e0
refactor(agents): migrate console.warn/error/info to subsystem logger (#22906)
Merged via /review-pr -> /prepare-pr -> /merge-pr.

Prepared head SHA: a806c4cb2700564096ce8980a8d7f839f8a0d388
Co-authored-by: Kepler2024 <166882517+Kepler2024@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: gumadeiras <5599352+gumadeiras@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: @gumadeiras
2026-02-21 17:11:47 -05:00
Peter Steinberger
621d8e1312 fix(sandbox): require noVNC observer password auth 2026-02-21 13:44:24 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
b8b43175c5 style: align formatting with oxfmt 0.33 2026-02-18 01:34:35 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
638853c6d2 fix(security): sanitize sandbox env vars before docker launch 2026-02-18 02:18:05 +01:00
cpojer
d0cb8c19b2
chore: wtf. 2026-02-17 13:36:48 +09:00
Sebastian
ed11e93cf2 chore(format) 2026-02-16 23:20:16 -05:00
Peter Steinberger
901d4cb310 revert: accidental merge of OC-09 sandbox env sanitization change 2026-02-17 03:19:42 +01:00
cpojer
90ef2d6bdf
chore: Update formatting. 2026-02-17 09:18:40 +09:00
aether-ai-agent
235794d9f6 fix(security): OC-09 credential theft via environment variable injection
Implement comprehensive environment variable sanitization before Docker
container creation to prevent credential theft via post-exploitation
environment access.

Security Impact:
- Blocks 39+ sensitive credential patterns (API keys, tokens, passwords)
- Prevents exfiltration of ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.
- Fail-secure validation with audit logging

Changes:
- Add sanitize-env-vars.ts with blocklist/allowlist validation
- Integrate sanitization into docker.ts (lines 273-294)
- Add validateEnvVars() to security validation
- Comprehensive test suite (62 tests, 100% pass rate)

Test Results: 62/62 passing
Code Review: 9.5/10 approved
Severity: HIGH (CWE-200, CVSS 7.5)

Signed-off-by: Aether AI Agent <github@tryaether.ai>
2026-02-17 00:00:23 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
887b209db4 fix(security): harden sandbox docker config validation 2026-02-16 03:04:06 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
1f1fc095a0
refactor(sandbox): auto-recreate browser container on config changes (#16254) 2026-02-14 15:47:59 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
31c6a12cfa fix(agents): restore missing runtime helpers and sandbox types 2026-02-13 15:42:05 +00:00
davidbors-snyk
29d7839582
fix: execute sandboxed file ops inside containers (#4026)
Merged via /review-pr -> /prepare-pr -> /merge-pr.

Prepared head SHA: 795ec6aa2f311fcda6660876dbadb4ef356bc0ac
Co-authored-by: davidbors-snyk <240482518+davidbors-snyk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: steipete <58493+steipete@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: @steipete
2026-02-13 16:29:10 +01:00
George Pickett
a067565db5 fix: pass sandbox docker env into containers (#15138) (thanks @stevebot-alive) 2026-02-12 19:39:22 -08:00
Steve (OpenClaw)
92567765e6 fix(sandbox): pass docker.env into sandbox container 2026-02-12 19:39:22 -08:00
cpojer
f06dd8df06
chore: Enable "experimentalSortImports" in Oxfmt and reformat all imorts. 2026-02-01 10:03:47 +09:00
cpojer
5ceff756e1
chore: Enable "curly" rule to avoid single-statement if confusion/errors. 2026-01-31 16:19:20 +09:00
Peter Steinberger
9a7160786a refactor: rename to openclaw 2026-01-30 03:16:21 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
6d16a658e5 refactor: rename clawdbot to moltbot with legacy compat 2026-01-27 12:21:02 +00:00
google-labs-jules[bot]
f58ad7625f fix(sandbox): simplify docker image check
Simplify the stderr check in `dockerImageExists` to only look for "No such image", as requested in code review.
2026-01-24 00:30:24 +00:00
google-labs-jules[bot]
49c6d8019f fix(sandbox): improve docker image existence check error handling
Previously, `dockerImageExists` assumed any error from `docker image inspect` meant the image did not exist. This masked other errors like socket permission issues.

This change:
- Modifies `dockerImageExists` to inspect stderr when the exit code is non-zero.
- Returns `false` only if the error explicitly indicates "No such image" or "No such object".
- Throws an error with the stderr content for all other failures.
- Adds a reproduction test in `src/agents/sandbox/docker.test.ts`.
2026-01-24 00:30:24 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
6d5195c890 refactor: normalize cli command hints 2026-01-20 07:43:00 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
2dc9c95530 style: oxfmt core files 2026-01-19 05:59:29 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
79d8267413 feat: auto-recreate sandbox containers on config change 2026-01-19 01:35:27 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
c379191f80 chore: migrate to oxlint and oxfmt
Co-authored-by: Christoph Nakazawa <christoph.pojer@gmail.com>
2026-01-14 15:02:19 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
bcbfb357be refactor(src): split oversized modules 2026-01-14 01:17:56 +00:00