* refactor: remove channel shim directories, point all imports to extensions
Delete the 6 backward-compat shim directories (src/telegram, src/discord,
src/slack, src/signal, src/imessage, src/web) that were re-exporting from
extensions. Update all 112+ source files to import directly from
extensions/{channel}/src/ instead of through the shims.
Also:
- Move src/channels/telegram/ (allow-from, api) to extensions/telegram/src/
- Fix outbound adapters to use resolveOutboundSendDep (fixes 5 pre-existing TS errors)
- Update cross-extension imports (src/web/media.js → extensions/whatsapp/src/media.js)
- Update vitest, tsdown, knip, labeler, and script configs for new paths
- Update guard test allowlists for extension paths
After this, src/ has zero channel-specific implementation code — only the
generic plugin framework remains.
* fix: update raw-fetch guard allowlist line numbers after shim removal
* refactor: document direct extension channel imports
* test: mock transcript module in delivery helpers
* fix(gateway): move plugin HTTP routes before Control UI SPA catch-all
The Control UI handler (`handleControlUiHttpRequest`) acts as an SPA
catch-all that matches every path, returning HTML for GET requests and
405 for other methods. Because it ran before `handlePluginRequest` in
the request chain, any plugin HTTP route that did not live under
`/plugins` or `/api` was unreachable — shadowed by the catch-all.
Reorder the handlers so plugin routes are evaluated first. Core
built-in routes (hooks, tools, Slack, Canvas, etc.) still take
precedence because they are checked even earlier in the chain.
Unmatched plugin paths continue to fall through to Control UI as before.
Closes#31766
* fix: add changelog for plugin route precedence landing (#31885) (thanks @Sid-Qin)
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
* security: add baseline security headers to gateway HTTP responses
All responses from the gateway HTTP server now include
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Referrer-Policy: no-referrer.
These headers are applied early in handleRequest, before any
handler runs, ensuring coverage for every response including
error pages and 404s.
Headers that restrict framing (X-Frame-Options, CSP
frame-ancestors) are intentionally omitted at this global level
because the canvas host and A2UI handlers serve content that may
be loaded inside frames.
* fix: apply security headers before WebSocket upgrade check
Move setDefaultSecurityHeaders() above the WebSocket early-return so
the headers are set on every HTTP response path including upgrades.
---------
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* feat(gateway): add auth rate-limiting & brute-force protection
Add a per-IP sliding-window rate limiter to Gateway authentication
endpoints (HTTP, WebSocket upgrade, and WS message-level auth).
When gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured, failed auth attempts are
tracked per client IP. Once the threshold is exceeded within the
sliding window, further attempts are blocked with HTTP 429 + Retry-After
until the lockout period expires. Loopback addresses are exempt by
default so local CLI sessions are never locked out.
The limiter is only created when explicitly configured (undefined
otherwise), keeping the feature fully opt-in and backward-compatible.
* fix(gateway): isolate auth rate-limit scopes and normalize 429 responses
---------
Co-authored-by: buerbaumer <buerbaumer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
