openclaw/src/infra/host-env-security.ts

75 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript

const HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEY_VALUES = [
"NODE_OPTIONS",
"NODE_PATH",
"PYTHONHOME",
"PYTHONPATH",
"PERL5LIB",
"PERL5OPT",
"RUBYLIB",
"RUBYOPT",
"BASH_ENV",
"ENV",
"GCONV_PATH",
"IFS",
"SSLKEYLOGFILE",
] as const;
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEYS = new Set<string>(HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEY_VALUES);
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_PREFIXES = ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_"] as const;
export function isDangerousHostEnvVarName(key: string): boolean {
const upper = key.toUpperCase();
if (HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEYS.has(upper)) {
return true;
}
return HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => upper.startsWith(prefix));
}
export function sanitizeHostExecEnv(params?: {
baseEnv?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
overrides?: Record<string, string> | null;
blockPathOverrides?: boolean;
}): Record<string, string> {
const baseEnv = params?.baseEnv ?? process.env;
const overrides = params?.overrides ?? undefined;
const blockPathOverrides = params?.blockPathOverrides ?? true;
const merged: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const [rawKey, value] of Object.entries(baseEnv)) {
if (typeof value !== "string") {
continue;
}
const key = rawKey.trim();
if (!key || isDangerousHostEnvVarName(key)) {
continue;
}
merged[key] = value;
}
if (!overrides) {
return merged;
}
for (const [rawKey, value] of Object.entries(overrides)) {
if (typeof value !== "string") {
continue;
}
const key = rawKey.trim();
if (!key) {
continue;
}
const upper = key.toUpperCase();
// PATH is part of the security boundary (command resolution + safe-bin checks). Never allow
// request-scoped PATH overrides from agents/gateways.
if (blockPathOverrides && upper === "PATH") {
continue;
}
if (isDangerousHostEnvVarName(upper)) {
continue;
}
merged[key] = value;
}
return merged;
}