openclaw/src/infra/host-env-security.test.ts
Josh Avant 7abfff756d
Exec: harden host env override handling across gateway and node (#51207)
* Exec: harden host env override enforcement and fail closed

* Node host: enforce env override diagnostics before shell filtering

* Env overrides: align Windows key handling and mac node rejection
2026-03-20 15:44:15 -05:00

467 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript

import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
import fs from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName,
isDangerousHostEnvVarName,
normalizeEnvVarKey,
sanitizeHostExecEnv,
sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics,
sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides,
} from "./host-env-security.js";
import { OPENCLAW_CLI_ENV_VALUE } from "./openclaw-exec-env.js";
function getSystemGitPath() {
if (process.platform === "win32") {
return null;
}
const gitPath = "/usr/bin/git";
return fs.existsSync(gitPath) ? gitPath : null;
}
function clearMarker(marker: string) {
try {
fs.unlinkSync(marker);
} catch {
// no-op
}
}
async function runGitLsRemote(gitPath: string, target: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
const child = spawn(gitPath, ["ls-remote", target], { env, stdio: "ignore" });
child.once("error", () => resolve());
child.once("close", () => resolve());
});
}
describe("isDangerousHostEnvVarName", () => {
it("matches dangerous keys and prefixes case-insensitively", () => {
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("BASH_ENV")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("bash_env")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("SHELL")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("git_exec_path")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("SHELLOPTS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("ps4")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("ld_preload")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("BASH_FUNC_echo%%")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("java_tool_options")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("_JAVA_OPTIONS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("_java_options")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("JDK_JAVA_OPTIONS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("jdk_java_options")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("PYTHONBREAKPOINT")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("pythonbreakpoint")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("dotnet_startup_hooks")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("DOTNET_ADDITIONAL_DEPS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("dotnet_additional_deps")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("GLIBC_TUNABLES")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("glibc_tunables")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("MAVEN_OPTS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("maven_opts")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("SBT_OPTS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("sbt_opts")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("GRADLE_OPTS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("gradle_opts")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("ANT_OPTS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("ant_opts")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("PATH")).toBe(false);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("FOO")).toBe(false);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvVarName("GRADLE_USER_HOME")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("sanitizeHostExecEnv", () => {
it("removes dangerous inherited keys while preserving PATH", () => {
const env = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
BASH_ENV: "/tmp/pwn.sh",
GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF: "/tmp/pwn.sh",
LD_PRELOAD: "/tmp/pwn.so",
OK: "1",
},
});
expect(env).toEqual({
OPENCLAW_CLI: OPENCLAW_CLI_ENV_VALUE,
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
OK: "1",
});
});
it("blocks PATH and dangerous override values", () => {
const env = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
HOME: "/tmp/trusted-home",
ZDOTDIR: "/tmp/trusted-zdotdir",
},
overrides: {
PATH: "/tmp/evil",
HOME: "/tmp/evil-home",
ZDOTDIR: "/tmp/evil-zdotdir",
BASH_ENV: "/tmp/pwn.sh",
GIT_SSH_COMMAND: "touch /tmp/pwned",
GIT_EXEC_PATH: "/tmp/git-exec-path",
EDITOR: "/tmp/editor",
NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG: "/tmp/npmrc",
GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: "/tmp/gitconfig",
SHELLOPTS: "xtrace",
PS4: "$(touch /tmp/pwned)",
CLASSPATH: "/tmp/evil-classpath",
GOFLAGS: "-mod=mod",
PHPRC: "/tmp/evil-php.ini",
XDG_CONFIG_HOME: "/tmp/evil-config",
SAFE: "ok",
},
});
expect(env.PATH).toBe("/usr/bin:/bin");
expect(env.OPENCLAW_CLI).toBe(OPENCLAW_CLI_ENV_VALUE);
expect(env.BASH_ENV).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.GIT_SSH_COMMAND).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.GIT_EXEC_PATH).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.EDITOR).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.SHELLOPTS).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.PS4).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.CLASSPATH).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.GOFLAGS).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.PHPRC).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.SAFE).toBe("ok");
expect(env.HOME).toBe("/tmp/trusted-home");
expect(env.ZDOTDIR).toBe("/tmp/trusted-zdotdir");
});
it("drops dangerous inherited shell trace keys", () => {
const env = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
SHELLOPTS: "xtrace",
PS4: "$(touch /tmp/pwned)",
OK: "1",
},
});
expect(env.PATH).toBe("/usr/bin:/bin");
expect(env.OPENCLAW_CLI).toBe(OPENCLAW_CLI_ENV_VALUE);
expect(env.OK).toBe("1");
expect(env.SHELLOPTS).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.PS4).toBeUndefined();
});
it("drops non-portable env key names", () => {
const env = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
},
overrides: {
" BAD KEY": "x",
"NOT-PORTABLE": "x",
GOOD_KEY: "ok",
},
});
expect(env.GOOD_KEY).toBe("ok");
expect(env.OPENCLAW_CLI).toBe(OPENCLAW_CLI_ENV_VALUE);
expect(env[" BAD KEY"]).toBeUndefined();
expect(env["NOT-PORTABLE"]).toBeUndefined();
});
it("can allow PATH overrides when explicitly opted out of blocking", () => {
const env = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
},
overrides: {
PATH: "/custom/bin",
},
blockPathOverrides: false,
});
expect(env.PATH).toBe("/custom/bin");
expect(env.OPENCLAW_CLI).toBe(OPENCLAW_CLI_ENV_VALUE);
});
it("drops non-string inherited values while preserving non-portable inherited keys", () => {
const env = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
GOOD: "1",
// oxlint-disable-next-line typescript/no-explicit-any
BAD_NUMBER: 1 as any,
"NOT-PORTABLE": "x",
"ProgramFiles(x86)": "C:\\Program Files (x86)",
},
});
expect(env).toEqual({
OPENCLAW_CLI: OPENCLAW_CLI_ENV_VALUE,
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
GOOD: "1",
"NOT-PORTABLE": "x",
"ProgramFiles(x86)": "C:\\Program Files (x86)",
});
});
});
describe("isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName", () => {
it("matches override-only blocked keys case-insensitively", () => {
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("HOME")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("zdotdir")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("GIT_SSH_COMMAND")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("editor")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("git_config_global")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("GRADLE_USER_HOME")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("gradle_user_home")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("CLASSPATH")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("classpath")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("GOFLAGS")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("goflags")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("CORECLR_PROFILER_PATH")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("coreclr_profiler_path")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("xdg_config_home")).toBe(true);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("BASH_ENV")).toBe(false);
expect(isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("FOO")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics", () => {
it("reports blocked and invalid requested overrides", () => {
const result = sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
},
overrides: {
PATH: "/tmp/evil",
CLASSPATH: "/tmp/evil-classpath",
SAFE_KEY: "ok",
"BAD-KEY": "bad",
},
});
expect(result.rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys).toEqual(["CLASSPATH", "PATH"]);
expect(result.rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys).toEqual(["BAD-KEY"]);
expect(result.env.SAFE_KEY).toBe("ok");
expect(result.env.PATH).toBe("/usr/bin:/bin");
expect(result.env.CLASSPATH).toBeUndefined();
});
it("allows Windows-style override names while still rejecting invalid keys", () => {
const result = sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics({
baseEnv: {
PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin",
"ProgramFiles(x86)": "C:\\Program Files (x86)",
},
overrides: {
"ProgramFiles(x86)": "D:\\SDKs",
"BAD-KEY": "bad",
},
});
expect(result.rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys).toEqual([]);
expect(result.rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys).toEqual(["BAD-KEY"]);
expect(result.env["ProgramFiles(x86)"]).toBe("D:\\SDKs");
});
});
describe("normalizeEnvVarKey", () => {
it("normalizes and validates keys", () => {
expect(normalizeEnvVarKey(" OPENROUTER_API_KEY ")).toBe("OPENROUTER_API_KEY");
expect(normalizeEnvVarKey("NOT-PORTABLE", { portable: true })).toBeNull();
expect(normalizeEnvVarKey(" BASH_FUNC_echo%% ")).toBe("BASH_FUNC_echo%%");
expect(normalizeEnvVarKey(" ")).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides", () => {
it("keeps overrides for non-shell commands", () => {
const overrides = sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides({
shellWrapper: false,
overrides: {
OPENCLAW_TEST: "1",
TOKEN: "abc",
},
});
expect(overrides).toEqual({
OPENCLAW_TEST: "1",
TOKEN: "abc",
});
});
it("drops non-allowlisted overrides for shell wrappers", () => {
const overrides = sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides({
shellWrapper: true,
overrides: {
OPENCLAW_TEST: "1",
TOKEN: "abc",
LANG: "C",
LC_ALL: "C",
},
});
expect(overrides).toEqual({
LANG: "C",
LC_ALL: "C",
});
});
it("returns undefined when no shell-wrapper overrides survive", () => {
expect(
sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides({
shellWrapper: true,
overrides: {
TOKEN: "abc",
},
}),
).toBeUndefined();
expect(sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides({ shellWrapper: true })).toBeUndefined();
});
it("keeps allowlisted shell-wrapper overrides case-insensitively", () => {
expect(
sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides({
shellWrapper: true,
overrides: {
lang: "C",
ColorTerm: "truecolor",
},
}),
).toEqual({
lang: "C",
ColorTerm: "truecolor",
});
});
});
describe("shell wrapper exploit regression", () => {
it("blocks SHELLOPTS/PS4 chain after sanitization", async () => {
const bashPath = "/bin/bash";
if (process.platform === "win32" || !fs.existsSync(bashPath)) {
return;
}
const marker = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `openclaw-ps4-marker-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
try {
fs.unlinkSync(marker);
} catch {
// no-op
}
const filteredOverrides = sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides({
shellWrapper: true,
overrides: {
SHELLOPTS: "xtrace",
PS4: `$(touch ${marker})`,
},
});
const env = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
overrides: filteredOverrides,
baseEnv: {
PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "/usr/bin:/bin",
},
});
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
const child = spawn(bashPath, ["-lc", "echo SAFE"], { env, stdio: "ignore" });
child.once("error", reject);
child.once("close", () => resolve());
});
expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("git env exploit regression", () => {
it("blocks inherited GIT_EXEC_PATH so git cannot execute helper payloads", async () => {
const gitPath = getSystemGitPath();
if (!gitPath) {
return;
}
const helperDir = fs.mkdtempSync(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), `openclaw-git-exec-path-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}-`),
);
const helperPath = path.join(helperDir, "git-remote-https");
const marker = path.join(
os.tmpdir(),
`openclaw-git-exec-path-marker-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`,
);
try {
clearMarker(marker);
fs.writeFileSync(helperPath, `#!/bin/sh\ntouch ${JSON.stringify(marker)}\nexit 1\n`, "utf8");
fs.chmodSync(helperPath, 0o755);
const target = "https://127.0.0.1:1/does-not-matter";
const unsafeEnv = {
PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "/usr/bin:/bin",
GIT_EXEC_PATH: helperDir,
GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0",
};
await runGitLsRemote(gitPath, target, unsafeEnv);
expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(true);
clearMarker(marker);
const safeEnv = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv: unsafeEnv,
});
await runGitLsRemote(gitPath, target, safeEnv);
expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(helperDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(marker, { force: true });
}
});
it("blocks GIT_SSH_COMMAND override so git cannot execute helper payloads", async () => {
const gitPath = getSystemGitPath();
if (!gitPath) {
return;
}
const marker = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `openclaw-git-ssh-command-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
clearMarker(marker);
const target = "ssh://127.0.0.1:1/does-not-matter";
const exploitValue = `touch ${JSON.stringify(marker)}; false`;
const baseEnv = {
PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "/usr/bin:/bin",
GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0",
};
const unsafeEnv = {
...baseEnv,
GIT_SSH_COMMAND: exploitValue,
};
await runGitLsRemote(gitPath, target, unsafeEnv);
expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(true);
clearMarker(marker);
const safeEnv = sanitizeHostExecEnv({
baseEnv,
overrides: {
GIT_SSH_COMMAND: exploitValue,
},
});
await runGitLsRemote(gitPath, target, safeEnv);
expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(false);
});
});