openclaw/src/infra/host-env-security.ts
Josh Avant 7abfff756d
Exec: harden host env override handling across gateway and node (#51207)
* Exec: harden host env override enforcement and fail closed

* Node host: enforce env override diagnostics before shell filtering

* Env overrides: align Windows key handling and mac node rejection
2026-03-20 15:44:15 -05:00

252 lines
7.7 KiB
TypeScript

import HOST_ENV_SECURITY_POLICY_JSON from "./host-env-security-policy.json" with { type: "json" };
import { markOpenClawExecEnv } from "./openclaw-exec-env.js";
const PORTABLE_ENV_VAR_KEY = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/;
const WINDOWS_COMPAT_OVERRIDE_ENV_VAR_KEY = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_()]*$/;
type HostEnvSecurityPolicy = {
blockedKeys: string[];
blockedOverrideKeys?: string[];
blockedOverridePrefixes?: string[];
blockedPrefixes: string[];
};
const HOST_ENV_SECURITY_POLICY = HOST_ENV_SECURITY_POLICY_JSON as HostEnvSecurityPolicy;
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEY_VALUES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze(
HOST_ENV_SECURITY_POLICY.blockedKeys.map((key) => key.toUpperCase()),
);
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze(
HOST_ENV_SECURITY_POLICY.blockedPrefixes.map((prefix) => prefix.toUpperCase()),
);
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEY_VALUES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze(
(HOST_ENV_SECURITY_POLICY.blockedOverrideKeys ?? []).map((key) => key.toUpperCase()),
);
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_OVERRIDE_ENV_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze(
(HOST_ENV_SECURITY_POLICY.blockedOverridePrefixes ?? []).map((prefix) => prefix.toUpperCase()),
);
export const HOST_SHELL_WRAPPER_ALLOWED_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEY_VALUES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([
"TERM",
"LANG",
"LC_ALL",
"LC_CTYPE",
"LC_MESSAGES",
"COLORTERM",
"NO_COLOR",
"FORCE_COLOR",
]);
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEYS = new Set<string>(HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEY_VALUES);
export const HOST_DANGEROUS_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEYS = new Set<string>(
HOST_DANGEROUS_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEY_VALUES,
);
export const HOST_SHELL_WRAPPER_ALLOWED_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEYS = new Set<string>(
HOST_SHELL_WRAPPER_ALLOWED_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEY_VALUES,
);
export type HostExecEnvSanitizationResult = {
env: Record<string, string>;
rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys: string[];
rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys: string[];
};
export type HostExecEnvOverrideDiagnostics = {
rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys: string[];
rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys: string[];
};
export function normalizeEnvVarKey(
rawKey: string,
options?: { portable?: boolean },
): string | null {
const key = rawKey.trim();
if (!key) {
return null;
}
if (options?.portable && !PORTABLE_ENV_VAR_KEY.test(key)) {
return null;
}
return key;
}
function normalizeHostOverrideEnvVarKey(rawKey: string): string | null {
const key = normalizeEnvVarKey(rawKey);
if (!key) {
return null;
}
if (PORTABLE_ENV_VAR_KEY.test(key) || WINDOWS_COMPAT_OVERRIDE_ENV_VAR_KEY.test(key)) {
return key;
}
return null;
}
export function isDangerousHostEnvVarName(rawKey: string): boolean {
const key = normalizeEnvVarKey(rawKey);
if (!key) {
return false;
}
const upper = key.toUpperCase();
if (HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_KEYS.has(upper)) {
return true;
}
return HOST_DANGEROUS_ENV_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => upper.startsWith(prefix));
}
export function isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName(rawKey: string): boolean {
const key = normalizeEnvVarKey(rawKey);
if (!key) {
return false;
}
const upper = key.toUpperCase();
if (HOST_DANGEROUS_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEYS.has(upper)) {
return true;
}
return HOST_DANGEROUS_OVERRIDE_ENV_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => upper.startsWith(prefix));
}
function listNormalizedEnvEntries(
source: Record<string, string | undefined>,
options?: { portable?: boolean },
): Array<[string, string]> {
const entries: Array<[string, string]> = [];
for (const [rawKey, value] of Object.entries(source)) {
if (typeof value !== "string") {
continue;
}
const key = normalizeEnvVarKey(rawKey, options);
if (!key) {
continue;
}
entries.push([key, value]);
}
return entries;
}
function sortUnique(values: Iterable<string>): string[] {
return Array.from(new Set(values)).toSorted((a, b) => a.localeCompare(b));
}
function sanitizeHostEnvOverridesWithDiagnostics(params?: {
overrides?: Record<string, string> | null;
blockPathOverrides?: boolean;
}): {
acceptedOverrides?: Record<string, string>;
rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys: string[];
rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys: string[];
} {
const overrides = params?.overrides ?? undefined;
if (!overrides) {
return {
acceptedOverrides: undefined,
rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys: [],
rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys: [],
};
}
const blockPathOverrides = params?.blockPathOverrides ?? true;
const acceptedOverrides: Record<string, string> = {};
const rejectedBlocked: string[] = [];
const rejectedInvalid: string[] = [];
for (const [rawKey, value] of Object.entries(overrides)) {
if (typeof value !== "string") {
continue;
}
const normalized = normalizeHostOverrideEnvVarKey(rawKey);
if (!normalized) {
const candidate = rawKey.trim();
rejectedInvalid.push(candidate || rawKey);
continue;
}
const upper = normalized.toUpperCase();
// PATH is part of the security boundary (command resolution + safe-bin checks). Never allow
// request-scoped PATH overrides from agents/gateways.
if (blockPathOverrides && upper === "PATH") {
rejectedBlocked.push(upper);
continue;
}
if (isDangerousHostEnvVarName(upper) || isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName(upper)) {
rejectedBlocked.push(upper);
continue;
}
acceptedOverrides[normalized] = value;
}
return {
acceptedOverrides,
rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys: sortUnique(rejectedBlocked),
rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys: sortUnique(rejectedInvalid),
};
}
export function sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics(params?: {
baseEnv?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
overrides?: Record<string, string> | null;
blockPathOverrides?: boolean;
}): HostExecEnvSanitizationResult {
const baseEnv = params?.baseEnv ?? process.env;
const merged: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const [key, value] of listNormalizedEnvEntries(baseEnv)) {
if (isDangerousHostEnvVarName(key)) {
continue;
}
merged[key] = value;
}
const overrideResult = sanitizeHostEnvOverridesWithDiagnostics({
overrides: params?.overrides ?? undefined,
blockPathOverrides: params?.blockPathOverrides ?? true,
});
if (overrideResult.acceptedOverrides) {
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(overrideResult.acceptedOverrides)) {
merged[key] = value;
}
}
return {
env: markOpenClawExecEnv(merged),
rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys: overrideResult.rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys,
rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys: overrideResult.rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys,
};
}
export function inspectHostExecEnvOverrides(params?: {
overrides?: Record<string, string> | null;
blockPathOverrides?: boolean;
}): HostExecEnvOverrideDiagnostics {
const result = sanitizeHostEnvOverridesWithDiagnostics(params);
return {
rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys: result.rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys,
rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys: result.rejectedOverrideInvalidKeys,
};
}
export function sanitizeHostExecEnv(params?: {
baseEnv?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
overrides?: Record<string, string> | null;
blockPathOverrides?: boolean;
}): Record<string, string> {
return sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics(params).env;
}
export function sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides(params?: {
overrides?: Record<string, string> | null;
shellWrapper?: boolean;
}): Record<string, string> | undefined {
const overrides = params?.overrides ?? undefined;
if (!overrides) {
return undefined;
}
if (!params?.shellWrapper) {
return overrides;
}
const filtered: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const [key, value] of listNormalizedEnvEntries(overrides, { portable: true })) {
if (!HOST_SHELL_WRAPPER_ALLOWED_OVERRIDE_ENV_KEYS.has(key.toUpperCase())) {
continue;
}
filtered[key] = value;
}
return Object.keys(filtered).length > 0 ? filtered : undefined;
}