openclaw/src/agents/skills/env-overrides.ts
Josh Avant 806803b7ef
feat(secrets): expand SecretRef coverage across user-supplied credentials (#29580)
* feat(secrets): expand secret target coverage and gateway tooling

* docs(secrets): align gateway and CLI secret docs

* chore(protocol): regenerate swift gateway models for secrets methods

* fix(config): restore talk apiKey fallback and stabilize runner test

* ci(windows): reduce test worker count for shard stability

* ci(windows): raise node heap for test shard stability

* test(feishu): make proxy env precedence assertion windows-safe

* fix(gateway): resolve auth password SecretInput refs for clients

* fix(gateway): resolve remote SecretInput credentials for clients

* fix(secrets): skip inactive refs in command snapshot assignments

* fix(secrets): scope gateway.remote refs to effective auth surfaces

* fix(secrets): ignore memory defaults when enabled agents disable search

* fix(secrets): honor Google Chat serviceAccountRef inheritance

* fix(secrets): address tsgo errors in command and gateway collectors

* fix(secrets): avoid auth-store load in providers-only configure

* fix(gateway): defer local password ref resolution by precedence

* fix(secrets): gate telegram webhook secret refs by webhook mode

* fix(secrets): gate slack signing secret refs to http mode

* fix(secrets): skip telegram botToken refs when tokenFile is set

* fix(secrets): gate discord pluralkit refs by enabled flag

* fix(secrets): gate discord voice tts refs by voice enabled

* test(secrets): make runtime fixture modes explicit

* fix(cli): resolve local qr password secret refs

* fix(cli): fail when gateway leaves command refs unresolved

* fix(gateway): fail when local password SecretRef is unresolved

* fix(gateway): fail when required remote SecretRefs are unresolved

* fix(gateway): resolve local password refs only when password can win

* fix(cli): skip local password SecretRef resolution on qr token override

* test(gateway): cast SecretRef fixtures to OpenClawConfig

* test(secrets): activate mode-gated targets in runtime coverage fixture

* fix(cron): support SecretInput webhook tokens safely

* fix(bluebubbles): support SecretInput passwords across config paths

* fix(msteams): make appPassword SecretInput-safe in onboarding/token paths

* fix(bluebubbles): align SecretInput schema helper typing

* fix(cli): clarify secrets.resolve version-skew errors

* refactor(secrets): return structured inactive paths from secrets.resolve

* refactor(gateway): type onboarding secret writes as SecretInput

* chore(protocol): regenerate swift models for secrets.resolve

* feat(secrets): expand extension credential secretref support

* fix(secrets): gate web-search refs by active provider

* fix(onboarding): detect SecretRef credentials in extension status

* fix(onboarding): allow keeping existing ref in secret prompt

* fix(onboarding): resolve gateway password SecretRefs for probe and tui

* fix(onboarding): honor secret-input-mode for local gateway auth

* fix(acp): resolve gateway SecretInput credentials

* fix(secrets): gate gateway.remote refs to remote surfaces

* test(secrets): cover pattern matching and inactive array refs

* docs(secrets): clarify secrets.resolve and remote active surfaces

* fix(bluebubbles): keep existing SecretRef during onboarding

* fix(tests): resolve CI type errors in new SecretRef coverage

* fix(extensions): replace raw fetch with SSRF-guarded fetch

* test(secrets): mark gateway remote targets active in runtime coverage

* test(infra): normalize home-prefix expectation across platforms

* fix(cli): only resolve local qr password refs in password mode

* test(cli): cover local qr token mode with unresolved password ref

* docs(cli): clarify local qr password ref resolution behavior

* refactor(extensions): reuse sdk SecretInput helpers

* fix(wizard): resolve onboarding env-template secrets before plaintext

* fix(cli): surface secrets.resolve diagnostics in memory and qr

* test(secrets): repair post-rebase runtime and fixtures

* fix(gateway): skip remote password ref resolution when token wins

* fix(secrets): treat tailscale remote gateway refs as active

* fix(gateway): allow remote password fallback when token ref is unresolved

* fix(gateway): ignore stale local password refs for none and trusted-proxy

* fix(gateway): skip remote secret ref resolution on local call paths

* test(cli): cover qr remote tailscale secret ref resolution

* fix(secrets): align gateway password active-surface with auth inference

* fix(cli): resolve inferred local gateway password refs in qr

* fix(gateway): prefer resolvable remote password over token ref pre-resolution

* test(gateway): cover none and trusted-proxy stale password refs

* docs(secrets): sync qr and gateway active-surface behavior

* fix: restore stability blockers from pre-release audit

* Secrets: fix collector/runtime precedence contradictions

* docs: align secrets and web credential docs

* fix(rebase): resolve integration regressions after main rebase

* fix(node-host): resolve gateway secret refs for auth

* fix(secrets): harden secretinput runtime readers

* gateway: skip inactive auth secretref resolution

* cli: avoid gateway preflight for inactive secret refs

* extensions: allow unresolved refs in onboarding status

* tests: fix qr-cli module mock hoist ordering

* Security: align audit checks with SecretInput resolution

* Gateway: resolve local-mode remote fallback secret refs

* Node host: avoid resolving inactive password secret refs

* Secrets runtime: mark Slack appToken inactive for HTTP mode

* secrets: keep inactive gateway remote refs non-blocking

* cli: include agent memory secret targets in runtime resolution

* docs(secrets): sync docs with active-surface and web search behavior

* fix(secrets): keep telegram top-level token refs active for blank account tokens

* fix(daemon): resolve gateway password secret refs for probe auth

* fix(secrets): skip IRC NickServ ref resolution when NickServ is disabled

* fix(secrets): align token inheritance and exec timeout defaults

* docs(secrets): clarify active-surface notes in cli docs

* cli: require secrets.resolve gateway capability

* gateway: log auth secret surface diagnostics

* secrets: remove dead provider resolver module

* fix(secrets): restore gateway auth precedence and fallback resolution

* fix(tests): align plugin runtime mock typings

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
2026-03-03 02:58:20 +00:00

203 lines
5.8 KiB
TypeScript

import type { OpenClawConfig } from "../../config/config.js";
import { normalizeResolvedSecretInputString } from "../../config/types.secrets.js";
import { isDangerousHostEnvVarName } from "../../infra/host-env-security.js";
import { createSubsystemLogger } from "../../logging/subsystem.js";
import { sanitizeEnvVars, validateEnvVarValue } from "../sandbox/sanitize-env-vars.js";
import { resolveSkillConfig } from "./config.js";
import { resolveSkillKey } from "./frontmatter.js";
import type { SkillEntry, SkillSnapshot } from "./types.js";
const log = createSubsystemLogger("env-overrides");
type EnvUpdate = { key: string; prev: string | undefined };
type SkillConfig = NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof resolveSkillConfig>>;
type SanitizedSkillEnvOverrides = {
allowed: Record<string, string>;
blocked: string[];
warnings: string[];
};
// Always block skill env overrides that can alter runtime loading or host execution behavior.
const SKILL_ALWAYS_BLOCKED_ENV_PATTERNS: ReadonlyArray<RegExp> = [/^OPENSSL_CONF$/i];
function matchesAnyPattern(value: string, patterns: readonly RegExp[]): boolean {
return patterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(value));
}
function isAlwaysBlockedSkillEnvKey(key: string): boolean {
return (
isDangerousHostEnvVarName(key) || matchesAnyPattern(key, SKILL_ALWAYS_BLOCKED_ENV_PATTERNS)
);
}
function sanitizeSkillEnvOverrides(params: {
overrides: Record<string, string>;
allowedSensitiveKeys: Set<string>;
}): SanitizedSkillEnvOverrides {
if (Object.keys(params.overrides).length === 0) {
return { allowed: {}, blocked: [], warnings: [] };
}
const result = sanitizeEnvVars(params.overrides);
const allowed: Record<string, string> = {};
const blocked = new Set<string>();
const warnings = [...result.warnings];
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(result.allowed)) {
if (isAlwaysBlockedSkillEnvKey(key)) {
blocked.add(key);
continue;
}
allowed[key] = value;
}
for (const key of result.blocked) {
if (isAlwaysBlockedSkillEnvKey(key) || !params.allowedSensitiveKeys.has(key)) {
blocked.add(key);
continue;
}
const value = params.overrides[key];
if (!value) {
continue;
}
const warning = validateEnvVarValue(value);
if (warning) {
if (warning === "Contains null bytes") {
blocked.add(key);
continue;
}
warnings.push(`${key}: ${warning}`);
}
allowed[key] = value;
}
return { allowed, blocked: [...blocked], warnings };
}
function applySkillConfigEnvOverrides(params: {
updates: EnvUpdate[];
skillConfig: SkillConfig;
primaryEnv?: string | null;
requiredEnv?: string[] | null;
skillKey: string;
}) {
const { updates, skillConfig, primaryEnv, requiredEnv, skillKey } = params;
const allowedSensitiveKeys = new Set<string>();
const normalizedPrimaryEnv = primaryEnv?.trim();
if (normalizedPrimaryEnv) {
allowedSensitiveKeys.add(normalizedPrimaryEnv);
}
for (const envName of requiredEnv ?? []) {
const trimmedEnv = envName.trim();
if (trimmedEnv) {
allowedSensitiveKeys.add(trimmedEnv);
}
}
const pendingOverrides: Record<string, string> = {};
if (skillConfig.env) {
for (const [rawKey, envValue] of Object.entries(skillConfig.env)) {
const envKey = rawKey.trim();
if (!envKey || !envValue || process.env[envKey]) {
continue;
}
pendingOverrides[envKey] = envValue;
}
}
const resolvedApiKey =
normalizeResolvedSecretInputString({
value: skillConfig.apiKey,
path: `skills.entries.${skillKey}.apiKey`,
}) ?? "";
if (normalizedPrimaryEnv && resolvedApiKey && !process.env[normalizedPrimaryEnv]) {
if (!pendingOverrides[normalizedPrimaryEnv]) {
pendingOverrides[normalizedPrimaryEnv] = resolvedApiKey;
}
}
const sanitized = sanitizeSkillEnvOverrides({
overrides: pendingOverrides,
allowedSensitiveKeys,
});
if (sanitized.blocked.length > 0) {
log.warn(`Blocked skill env overrides for ${skillKey}: ${sanitized.blocked.join(", ")}`);
}
if (sanitized.warnings.length > 0) {
log.warn(`Suspicious skill env overrides for ${skillKey}: ${sanitized.warnings.join(", ")}`);
}
for (const [envKey, envValue] of Object.entries(sanitized.allowed)) {
if (process.env[envKey]) {
continue;
}
updates.push({ key: envKey, prev: process.env[envKey] });
process.env[envKey] = envValue;
}
}
function createEnvReverter(updates: EnvUpdate[]) {
return () => {
for (const update of updates) {
if (update.prev === undefined) {
delete process.env[update.key];
} else {
process.env[update.key] = update.prev;
}
}
};
}
export function applySkillEnvOverrides(params: { skills: SkillEntry[]; config?: OpenClawConfig }) {
const { skills, config } = params;
const updates: EnvUpdate[] = [];
for (const entry of skills) {
const skillKey = resolveSkillKey(entry.skill, entry);
const skillConfig = resolveSkillConfig(config, skillKey);
if (!skillConfig) {
continue;
}
applySkillConfigEnvOverrides({
updates,
skillConfig,
primaryEnv: entry.metadata?.primaryEnv,
requiredEnv: entry.metadata?.requires?.env,
skillKey,
});
}
return createEnvReverter(updates);
}
export function applySkillEnvOverridesFromSnapshot(params: {
snapshot?: SkillSnapshot;
config?: OpenClawConfig;
}) {
const { snapshot, config } = params;
if (!snapshot) {
return () => {};
}
const updates: EnvUpdate[] = [];
for (const skill of snapshot.skills) {
const skillConfig = resolveSkillConfig(config, skill.name);
if (!skillConfig) {
continue;
}
applySkillConfigEnvOverrides({
updates,
skillConfig,
primaryEnv: skill.primaryEnv,
requiredEnv: skill.requiredEnv,
skillKey: skill.name,
});
}
return createEnvReverter(updates);
}